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ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Appellants believe that the issues presented are well framed by the primary briefs and 
do not attempt herein to simply repeat what has already been stated. The purpose of this 
Reply Brief is to point out the errors of analysis made by the Ranger Insurance Company. 
The Appellee brief makes a very fundamental error which is actually the same error 
made at trial. The error becomes the foundation for going off in a wrong direction on all of 
the analysis made. That error is the assumption that there is legal authority to make an arrest 
in Miles Langley in Utah. Once that error is understood, that there needs be a reversal of the 
trial result becomes beyond dispute. 
II. NO LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR ARREST EXISTED 
A. Utah Law Controls. 
Ranger Insurance Company first argues that Gerald Lee could not be apprehended by 
Langley defies common sense, common law, and contractual agreements. Ranger reaches 
that conclusion only by ignoring the established framework of law. 
Ranger argues two legal basis for apprehending Gerald Lee. The first is the alleged 
common law right of Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872) which has been exhaustively 
discussed in the Lees primary brief. Lees again rely upon that discussion and simply point 
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out to the court that Ranger fails to produce any authority rebutting the fact that where a state 
scheme regulating arrest by bondsmen is in place, the Taylor case has been found to be 
inapplicable. In short, there is no source of authority for Langley coming from Colorado to 
do an arrest in Utah under common law. 
Second, Ranger makes a curious argument that because Gerald Lee agreed in a 
contract that he could be arrested by agents of the bond surety that legal authority existed for 
that arrest in Utah by the Colorado agent. Ranger tries to make a negative argument. That 
is, they argue because there is no Utah statute that says one cannot arrest from out-of-state 
on a contract that it must be legal. Ranger simply ignores Section 53-11-107(2) which 
prohibits anyone acting as a bail recovery agent in Utah without having a license. That is 
made a crime in Section 53-11-124. 
What Ranger argues is that if two people make a bail contract in another state, that 
contract overrides Utah law making it a crime for persons not licensed by Utah to make a bail 
apprehension. Virtually no authority whatsoever exists for such a proposition. In fact, it is 
Ranger that abandons common sense in making this analysis. The common sense approach 
would be for Ranger Insurance Company to hire in Utah a licensed bail enforcement agent 
rather than allow somebody to come from another state without a license and then claim they 
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are somehow above Utah law. This Court should reject the argument completely simply by 
applying the plain language of Title 53, Chapter 11. 
Mention should be made about the brief statement that Lees failed to marshal the 
evidence on the contractual basis for apprehension. This argument is a complete 
misapplication of the requirement that a party marshal the evidence on appeal. The 
requirement to marshal is directed to challenges concerning factual findings of the trial court. 
Reddish v. Russell 2005 Ut. App. 84 (February 25, 2005). This argument is inapplicable 
because there is no issue of factual finding. Lees do not deny that the bail bond contract was 
entered and it says what it says. What is at issue is the legal operation of that contract as to 
whether it somehow trumps Utah law on the requirement that a bail enforcement agent have 
a Utah license. There is no need to marshal the evidence on the requirement that a bail 
enforcement agent have a Utah license. 
B. This Issue Was Preserved. 
Ranger argues to the court that the error of the trial court in determining the law of 
arrest was not properly preserved for appeal. An examination of the record shows that the 
issue was talked about from the very beginning of the trial and addressed repeatedly 
throughout the trial. Eventually, jury instructions were given in the context of rejecting 
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instructions proposed by the Plaintiffs and over the objection of Plaintiffs' counsel to certain 
other objections. 
Specifically, the issue of the authority of a Colorado agent to arrest in Utah came up 
at the beginning of the trial and was actively discussed with the court as shown at Record, 
page 1187, at pp. 4-12, 20-31. The actual ruling over the Plaintiffs' objection is found on 
page 31 of the transcript. 
The District Court then indicated as part of a discussion on a motion brought by the 
defense during the course of the trial that it intended to give jury instructions to allow the jury 
to decide the legal authority to make an arrest. Again, this was done over the objection of 
Plaintiffs' counsel. Record, page 1187 at pp. 213-238. 
The court conducted the trial under the assumption that Langley did have legal 
authority to make an arrest in Utah but did reserve additional discussion in connection with 
jury instructions. Transcript, p. 238 at R., p. 1187. Plaintiffs' counsel stated on the record 
that there had been issues about jury instructions discussed in chambers that had to be placed 
on the record but the trial court again deferred that. Transcript, p. 181 at R., p. 1187. That 
discussion took place commencing at transcript page 243 through 248. 
A reading of the extensive repeated discussions between court and counsel on this 
topic show that what happened was that Plaintiffs' counsel always took the position that there 
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was no legal authority for a Colorado bail recovery agent to make an arrest in Utah and the 
court was on the wrong track. Ultimately, counsel conceded that if the court's view was to 
be the law of the case then the instructions the court was going to give were appropriate 
while reserving the objections to the whole direction of where arrest authority had gone. See 
trial transcript pages 213-238,291-295. 
Plaintiffs' counsel was so concerned the trial was headed in the wrong direction on 
the issue of arrest authority that a trial memorandum was submitted specifically on that point 
on the second day of trial. Record, p. 980. That the issue of arrest authority was not a matter 
of vigorous contention and objection with the court ultimately instructing contrary to the law 
cannot be seriously argued. 
The use of the term "exception" to the jury instruction by Ranger is not well taken as 
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically state that an "exception" is no longer 
necessary and that simply making an objection is sufficient to preserve a point for appeal. 
C. Arrest Authority Was Relevant to Assault. 
Ranger makes a brief argument that the legal authority to apprehend Mr. Lee was not 
relevant to the jury verdict concerning the assault or reckless endangerment resulting in 
harmless error. That position is absolutely wrong. 
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An assault is defined in Utah criminal law in Section 76-5-102 as an attempt, with 
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another. Utah's civil law has similarly held 
that the unlawful nature of the act is an element of assault in torts. See Banks v. Shivers, 432 
P.2d 339 (Utah 1967). The court there makes reference to Restatement of Torts (2d), Section 
21, which says an act of assault must not be "privileged". The official comment to that 
section defines privileged as allowed by law. 
Put simply, that the contact between Langley and the Lees be unlawful is 
extraordinarily important for consideration as it constitutes an element of the tort of assault. 
Similarly, the Lees' claim for negligence or reckless endangerment has an element of 
breach of duty. The duty is found in the requirement that a bail enforcement agent be 
licensed in Utah to act. Once Langley is found to be without legal authority, his actions 
could be interpreted by a jury to be at least negligent. The relevance of the legal authority 
to act is the foundation of the claim of plaintiffs and the failure of the court to give proper 
instruction justifies reversal. 
III. THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM SURVIVES 
Ranger argues in its brief that since Lees "were unable to assemble evidence in their 
case that Mr. Langley falsely imprisoned them" that the claim against the Lees was 
appropriately dismissed. 
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The failure of this analysis is again rooted in the assumption of the legal authority. 
As has already been explained, a key element of false imprisonment is whether it was done 
without legal authority. Once the court concluded there was a common law or contract right 
to make an arrest in Utah on a Colorado warrant, then the false imprisonment claim had to 
fail. This demonstrates the very point Lees attempt to make on appeal that the conclusion 
of arrest authority took the court on a completely wrong road. Lees have no dispute with the 
concept that if Langley had arrest authority then the false imprisonment claim would fail. 
The error is in the conclusion of legal authority as has been analyzed exhaustively above. 
A factual question exists as to whether George Lee, who was not a fugitive, was 
falsely imprisoned. The trial transcript reflects at Record, page 1187 at p. 214, that the court 
dismissed the false imprisonment claim with respect to George Lee based on the absence of 
evidence that he was falsely imprisoned. This was error on the court's part, setting aside 
issues of whether the arrest effort by Langley was even legal. A jury could have found that 
even George was falsely imprisoned under the appropriate legal standard. George's direct 
testimony, Record, page 1187 at pp. 188-197, shows that George Lee was in a place he had 
a right to be (his own home), and was restrained to that location by the acts of Miles Langley 
first knocking him unconscious and Langley then controlling the situation until police 
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arrived. While this situation is, admittedly, not an extended false imprisonment, the point 
remains that the court should not have taken this factual determination away from the jury. 
As a general statement, dismissal is a "severe measure" and should be granted by the 
trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief. Colman v. Utah State Land 
Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). What the court did in dismissing the George Lee false 
imprisonment claim is probably more appropriately labeled a Rule 50 directed verdict as it 
occurred at trial. A directed verdict is only appropriate where the court finds as a matter of 
law that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence 
presented. Management Committee of Gray stone Pines Homeowner's Association v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). This Court has recently held that a 
directed verdict in a jury trial is appropriate only after a jury trial. Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999 
Ut. App. 167, 982 P.2d 591. There was evidence available to allow the jury to decide 
whether false imprisonment of George Lee had taken place. 
False imprisonment includes as an element that any exercise of force by which the 
other person is deprived of liberty or compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain 
is false imprisonment. Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Company, 91 P.2d 507 (Utah 
1939). That George Lee was knocked unconscious under force in his own home can be 
construed factually as a false imprisonment but the jury never had an opportunity to get to 
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that question. With the Lee testimony before the jury, the court should have let them decide 
if both were falsely imprisoned, however brief. 
IV. FAILURE TO DEFAULT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Ranger tries to construct an argument that a default in its favor of Robert Thorpe but 
not in favor of the Lees for the same failure to appear by Thorpe is somehow not an abuse 
of discretion. 
Lees do not dispute that Ranger Insurance Company is entitled to a default of Robert 
Thorpe for failure to appear at trial. Where the trial court went wrong was not treating the 
Lees the same for the same acts by Robert Thorpe. 
Ranger argues that the Lees would attempt to "abuse the default judgment" but fails 
to explain why any supposed abuse could not have been controlled at trial. The question of 
the effect of a default is entirely different from the question of whether a default should be 
entered in the first place. The fact remains, as explained in the primary brief, that Robert 
Thorpe was allowed to benefit repeatedly throughout the trial by his failure to appear. 
Certainly, if the court had refused to enter a default in favor of Ranger an argument could be 
made that the court exercised its discretion in fairness to all parties. The refusal to enter a 
default in favor of the Lees for the same acts justifying a default in favor of Ranger Insurance 
Company is uneven application of justice which should be rejected by this Court. 
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Passing mention should be made of the Ranger argument that the Lees failed to 
marshal facts concerning the denial of a request for default judgment. Ranger cites no 
authority for this argument because there is none. There is no legal requirement under 
principles of marshaling that an appellant explain why a judge ruled as he does. The legal 
analysis is what he ruled in the context of the trial. A party at trial has no power to force a 
judge to fully explain why he or she ruled in a certain way and certainly cannot be held to 
have somehow waived an appeal where a judge chose not to amplify sufficiently to satisfy 
the opposing party. 
V. THE JUSTICE COURT TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE 
Ranger tries again to argue the failure to admit Langley's testimony injustice court 
was hearsay. This issue has been adequately explained in the primary brief and is not 
analyzed again except to say there is no legal authority to support Ranger's argument that 
Langley had no reason to believe he was jeopardizing his self-interest under Rule 804(b)(3), 
URE. The fact is, he was admitting to a criminal act under Utah law and that is sufficient to 
qualify the statement under that rule. 
Another incorrect argument is made by Ranger that excluding Langley's testimony 
injustice court was harmless. Ranger argues first that because the jury heard oral argument 
on the point to the trial judge that this Court should assume the jury considered the excluded 
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evidence as part of its deliberation. Again, there is no legal authority for such a proposition 
and it is contrary to common sense and good practice at trial. One cannot assume the jury 
made the decision on evidence that was not formally presented or else there would be no 
bounds to review of the decision. 
Second, Ranger argues that the evidence was irrelevant and therefore harmless in 
exclusion because whether Langley was licensed in Utah had no legal importance. This 
point, exhaustively discussed in this appeal, demonstrates again how the error on arrest 
authority of the court permeates what happened at trial at every turn. Once the court found 
there was legal authority outside of the Utah statute requiring a license to act, the 
presentation of evidence leading to what the jury was instructed was on a wrong road. In 
fact, the lack of Utah license was important to show Langley was acting outside the law and 
committed the torts alleged. 
VI. EXCLUSION OF THE RECEIPT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Ranger argues that the court correctly excluded the receipt evidencing payment by 
Robert Thorpe to Miles Langley for the apprehension of Gerald Lee. Remember that this 
arose in the context that Ranger Insurance was presenting evidence, the testimony of Mrs. 
Thorpe, that Langley had never been hired or compensated to apprehend Lee. See 
Addendum. 
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The contrary evidence was deceased Langley's own deposition testimony that he had 
been hired to go get Lee. Maria Thorpe, by video deposition, testified no payment was made. 
The Lees attempted to introduce this receipt as absolute proof that she was testifying 
incorrectly. See Record, page 1187 at p. 39-45 and Addendum, Maria Thorpe Testimony. 
Put in the context of the trial, what the jury had before it was (1) the statement of 
Langley that he was hired by Robert Thorpe, (2) a defaulting Robert Thorpe that was not 
there to be examined, and (3) an affirmative statement by Mrs. Thorpe, an admitted business 
partner of Robert, that the payment would never have taken place. The jury was denied the 
opportunity to see the handwritten document which conclusively established the payment 
took place and that Langley was compensated by Thorpe for the recovery of Lee. With 
Langley dead, Robert Thorpe willfully absent from the trial and a video presentation by Mrs. 
Thorpe, the impact of her testimony was very important and needed to be rebutted by the 
conclusive document which qualified for admission under the Rules of Evidence. Exclusion 
of the evidence broke the proof of chain of agency between Langley, Thorpe, and Ranger to 
the prejudice of Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
This whole appeal turns upon the question of the arrest authority of a Colorado bail 
recovery agent to enforce a Colorado warrant in Utah. Utah law is quite clear that bail 
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enforcement agents acting in Utah must have a Utah license. The trial court made a 
fundamental error at the beginning of the trial in finding that there was common law 
authority or even contractual authority to allow Miles Langley to arrest Gerald Lee. 
Plaintiffs' counsel made repeated objections to that approach throughout the trial to no avail. 
The error in law by the trial court then had a cascading effect as other issues followed. 
That is, the false imprisonment claim of the Plaintiffs was dismissed. The court instructed 
the jury that if they believe there was lawful authority to arrest then the assault and 
negligence claim could be justified. 
Even if this Court were to hold in favor of Ranger Insurance Company, the judgment 
should be reversed so as to allow entry of the default of Robert Thorpe. There was no factual 
or legal reason to distinguish entering a default in favor of Ranger Insurance Company but 
not in favor of the Plaintiffs. Robert Thorpe has continually received the benefit of his 
willful failure to participate in the proceedings even to being in default in this very appeal. 
Finally, reversible error occurred when the evidence that Langley had no license to 
act as a bail agent in Utah was excluded and when the trial court excluded the written receipt 
of Robert Thorpe which conclusively showed that he had paid Langley to act in his behalf 
in capturing Gerald Lee. 
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This Court is respectfully requested to reverse the trial court and remand this case for 
a new trial consistent with the law of arrest by a bail enforcement agent. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 2005. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Gregof 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Maria Thorpe testimony, R. p. 1187 at pp. 323-324 and deposition at pages 43-46. 
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The videotape deposition of MARIA E. 
THORPE, taken at the offices of Rusk & Rusk Court 
Reporters, 751 Horizon Court, Suite 110, Grand 
Junction, Colorado 81506, on the 22nd day of 
December, 2003, at 9:53 o'clock a.m., before 
Joppa H. Smith, Registered Professional Reporter 
and Notary Public at Large. 
* * * 
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Your Honor, ladies 
and gentlemen, today is December the 22nd 
of 2003. The following deposition is being 
videotaped by Esther Rusk of Rusk & Rusk 
Court Reporters, at the conference room of 
their office at Skyline Building, 751 
Horizon Court, Suite 110, Grand Junction, 
Colorado 81506, in the matter of George M. 
Lee and Gerald Lee, Plaintiffs, versus 
Miles Walter Langley, Robert P. Thorpe and 
The Ranger Insurance Company, Defendants, 
and filed in the Eighth Judicial District 
of Uintah County, State of Utah, Civil No. 
000800126. This deposition has been 
noticed by the Defendants, The Ranger 
Insurance Company. The deponent is Maria 
Thorpe. The time is approximately 9:55 
*** Not 
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a.m. 
Counsel will now identify themselves 
for the record. 
MS. BLANCH: Julianne Blanch for 
Ranger Insurance Company. 
MR. SANDERS: Craig Sanders for the 
Plaintiffs. 
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Joppa Smith, the 
court reporter, will now swear in the 
deponent. 
* * * 
MARIA E. THORPE, 
being produced and sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BLANCH: 
Q. This is Julianne Blanch. Mrs. 
Thorpe, can you state your full name for the 
record. 
A. It's Maria Elizabeth Thorpe. 
Q. Do you own a business named A-l Bail 
Bonds? 
A. Not currently, no. 
Q. Did you in 1999? 
A. Yes. 
es *** 1 
rSK & RUSK COURT RF.PORTFRS 
Page 42 
1 is that right? 
2 A. That's correct. 
3 Q. And that he was in jail? 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. And at that point, because he was 
6 in jail, was it necessary for him to get a second 
7 bond? 
8 A. For his release, yes. Bob revoked 
9 the Mesa County bond, and then posted two bonds 
10 to secure his release on the new warrant 
111 amounts. 
12 Q. So when Gerald Lee came back to 
13 Colorado on April 3 of 1999, the first bond 
14 that we've been talking about, the one dated 
15 November 30,1998, was revoked; is that right? 
116 A. The Rio Blanco bond was never 
17 revoked at the Mesa County Detention Facility. 
118 The Mesa County bond was revoked at the Mesa 
19 County Detention Facility. To my knowledge, 
20 he was remanded into custody on the Rio Blanco 
21 warrant, as well as the Mesa County warrant. 
22 Q. The second bond is in the amount of 
23 $750, while the first one back in 1998 is in the 
24 amount of $500. 
25 Why was the second bond more? 
Page44| 
I l A. As far as I can remember, we've only 
2 hired one person as an independent bail recovery 
3 agent, James Julianno out of New Mexico, to 
4 apprehend somebody that was out of state. 
5 Actually, there's twice. I had a 
6 Kelly - a defendant by the name of Kelly 
7 Bradbury that had fled on a plane, and she went 
8 to Arizona, and I contacted some bail agency 
9 in Arizona to meet her at the airport to 
10 detain her until I showed up and could bring her 
II back. 
12 Q. Were there any bail agents or bail 
13 bondsmen that you hired inside of Colorado to 
14 apprehend someone inside of Colorado? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Okay. In the bail bonding industry, 
17 is it typical for a company like A-l Bail Bonds, 
18 if they're going to hire an individual to go out 
19 and apprehend someone, just to hire them for a 
20 particular job? 
21 A. Can you say that again? 
22 Q. Sure. If someone like A-l Bail 
23 Bonds needs to hire a bail bondsman to apprehend 
24 an individual, is it typical in the industry 
25 for them to hire them just for that particular I 
Page 43 
1 A. The judges usually elevate the 
2 amount that is required to - for tteir release. 
3 Obviously a $500 secured bond wasn't enough to 
4 warrant Mr. Lee to come back and take care of 
5 his court obligations, so by increasing that 
6 amount, the courts are trying to provide an 
7 additional incentive, financial incentive, that 
8 they'll return. 
9 Q. Okay. Does A-l have any bail - or 
10 did A-l have any bail bondsmen as employees? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Were they independent contractors? 
13 A. They're what's called subagents. 
14 Q. It sounds like there were times when 
115 someone got a bond with A-l Bail Bonds, they 
16 failed to appear, and you needed to go apprehend 
17 them. 
18 Sometimes it sounds like you would 
19 do it; is that right? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Would your husband ever do it? 
22 A. Sometimes. 
23 Q. And then sometimes you would hire 
24 these independent contractor bail bondsmen to do 
25 it? 
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I 1 job? 
2 A. Yes. 
! 3 Q. When you used Mr. Julianno as an 
4 independent contractor bail bondsman, how did 
5 you pay him, how did you reimburse him for 
6 apprehending the individual? 
7 A. By check. 
8 Q. Do you understand that Mr. Langley 
9 has testified before in this case, he's given 
10 a deposition just like you have in this case? 
n A. Yes. 
12 Q. It's my understanding that he 
13 passed away. Do you know whether he has either 
14 way? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Mr. Langley said in his deposition 
17 that your husband, Robert Thorpe, paid him money 
18 to go get Mr. Lee in Vernal, Utah. 
19 Is that true, to your knowledge? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Have you looked through bank 
22 statements and cancelled checks from A-l Bail 
23 Bonds in April and May of 1999 just to verify 
24 that no check was ever given by A-l Bail Bonds 
25 to Mr. Langley? 
~c * * * 
*** Notes *** 
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A. Yes. 
Q. What have you found? 
A. There was no such payment. 
Q. Okay. Go ahead. 
A. There was also Gerald and Sherry 
Green that we've used for recovery, but like I 
said, those are just on a limited basis. And we 
would hire some out-of-state people to find 
people that are out of state to minimize our 
costs, because we don't know the areas, and it 
just takes a lot of time. 
Q. And have you paid all of those 
individuals with a check? 
A. Yes. 
MS. BLANCH: Let's mark as Exhibit 4 
what I've put in front of our court 
reporter. 
(Exhibit 4 marked). 
BY MS. BLANCH: 
Q. This is something that you sent to me 
last week; is that right? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Okay. As Mr. Sanders is looking it 
over, because he hasn't seen this yet, could you 
tell us what Exhibit 4 is? 
*** Nol 
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cancelled checks? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. But you can tell us now that after 
looking at your bank statements and the cancelled 
checks, there were no checks made out to Miles 
Langley? 
A. No, ma'am. 
Q. We have been talking about two 
bonds, one is November 30,1998, and then there 
was a second one. I don't know if you've 
brought that with you. 
A. I think both bonds were originally 
written on the same date, and then when he was 
re-incarcerated, both bonds would be posted on 
the same date, to the best of my knowledge. 
Q. Okay. The second bond would have 
been dated around April 3 of 1999, wouldn't it 
have? 
A. Yes, ma'am. April 30 maybe. April 3 
or April 30, I'm sorry. 
Q. Okay. Between the time that you j 
learned -
A. April 3. 
Q. Okay. April 3? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
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A. It's bank statements for our business 
account, for A-l Bail Bonds. 
Q. From what time period? 
A. I believe from the end of March 
until maybe May or June. 
Q. Okay. And why did--
A. Prior to the date of his recovery, 
and then a month or more after that time. 
Q. Why did you get those bank 
statements? 
A. To look to see if a payment had, in 
fact, been made. You know, just to clarify, so 
that I could make exact responses today. Even 
though I had no knowledge of any payment, I 
just wanted to double-check for my own peace of 
mind. 
Q. And you've also brought cancelled 
checks with you, I noticed? 
A. Yes, ma'am, so that if there's any 
misunderstanding about any amount that appears 
on there, that the actual check can be viewed to 
see to whom it was endorsed and where it was 
cashed and the date it was issued. 
Q. Okay. If Mr. Sanders wishes during a 
break, will he be able to look through those 
_ _ 
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Q. So one is dated November 30,'98, the 
other is dated April 3 of '99? 
A. That's correct 
Q. Between the time that vou learned 
that Miles Langley had apprehended Gerald Lee 
and brought him back to Colorado and the time 
you issued the second bond on April 3 of 1999, 
did you or anyone at A-l Bail Bonds tell Ranger 
that Mr. Langley had apprehended Mr. Lee? 
A. I don't believe so, no. 
Q. Did you or anyone else at A-l Bail 
Bonds tell Ranger about the circumstances of 
how Mr. Langley had apprehended Mr. Lee? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. Okay. To your knowledge, would 
Ranger have had any way of knowing that there 
was a scuffle between Mr. Langley and the Lee 
brothers during the apprehension? 
A. Not by our agency, no. 
(Exhibit 5 marked). 
BY MS. BLANCH: 
Q. What we've marked as Exhibit 5 is a 1 
copy of the bail bond underwriting agreement 1 
between Ranger and A-l Bail Bonds. 1 
MS. BLANCH: And I don't know 
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